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1. Introduction1 
“The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” (Friedman, 1970). In the past, many 
business executives have voiced their support for the idea that a business should be run exclusively 
with a view to profits or shareholder returns. Today, however, most executives would be disinclined 
to express themselves this bluntly. The increased focus on corporate social responsibility (CSR) or 
corporate citizenship, might even give the appearance that corporations may have strayed from the 
narrow path of profit maximization, focusing instead on a wider or different set of goals.  
 
Appearances can, however, be deceiving. Upon closer scrutiny, it becomes apparent that CSR is in 
many cases simply viewed as an instrument to increase profitability, rather than a fundamental goal 
in itself. The following quote from a top executive of one of the world’s largest oil companies 
provides an illustration of this: 
 
“Corporate social responsibility is not itself our business but rather it is a way of 
conducting our business which, we believe, helps us to be more successful over the 
long-term. To commit to a socially responsible way of working is not, as some 
critics claim, a distraction from our core business. Nor does it in any way conflict 
with our promise and our duty to deliver value to our shareholders. In fact, just the 
reverse is true. This agenda is an attendant duty to our shareholders who make 
investments for the long-term and who need to have confidence they will see a 
return on those investments over the long-term” (Adrian Loader, Director of 
Strategic Planning, Sustainable Development and External Affairs, Royal 
Dutch/Shell Group)2 
 
In other words, CSR is not a fundamental end for corporate action, it is a means to the fundamental 
end of increasing shareholder returns. The above statement is by no means unique, which indicates 
that profit maximization or maximizing shareholder returns, remains the fundamental principle 
many corporate executives live by.3 This has lead some observers to argue that CSR policies are 
basically insincere (Bakan, 2004). 
 
Some corporate executives do, however, take a less direct approach, eschewing the question of 
whether CSR or profitability is the fundamental end. A common argument used is that CSR and 
profits go together. This is voiced for instance in the following excerpt from a speech given by the 
CEO of the world’s largest corporation (in terms of market value): 
 
“What I really want to talk about today is how a CEO or what business leaders can 
do to create a great and good company. Great in the sense of tremendous results for 
our investors and for our customers, growth and profitability, and good in the sense 
of connection to the world, adding to the quality of our work force and our 
customers and the communities we’re a part of. Because profits alone cannot build 
reputation. And I also believe that doing things right ultimately will lead to more 
profitability” (Jeff Immelt, CEO, General Electric)4 
 
                                                     
1 The author thanks Arne Wiig and Bertil Tungodden for helpful comments. 
2 http://www.shell.com/static/media-en/downloads/speeches/adrianloader_sg_csr_23022004.pdf 
3 Granted, executives often pursue their own self-interest to the detriment of shareholders, but the publicly asserted 
normative basis of their actions is maximizing shareholder returns. 
4 http://www.ge.com/files/usa/en/company/news/Jeff_Immelt_BC_Speech.pdf 
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If the argument holds, and CSR and profits go together in a systematic way, it does not really matter 
whether the corporation treats advancing one or the other as its fundamental goal. If all good things 
go together, corporate executives never have to face dilemmas or make trade-offs between social 
and profitability objectives. 
 
What we might term the neo-Friedmanian position on CSR, thus argues that out of all possible CSR 
policies, corporate executives should adopt those, and only those, that increase ownership returns. 
In contrast, the dilemma-less position on CSR, posits that whatever CSR policies a corporation 
adopts, will promote ownership returns. This article argues that neither of the two positions 
presented here, stands up to closer scrutiny. In section 2, the arguments for the Friedmanian view of 
profit maximization are refuted. Furthermore, it is argued that profit maximization cannot be a 
fundamental principle of any reasonable ethical theory. And if a maxim of profit maximization is 
derived from other fundamental principles, it will be subject to exceptions. Solely using CSR as a 
means to a fundamental end of profit maximization, is thus not ethically defensible. In section 3, it 
is shown that the notion that CSR and profits always go together in a positive way, is not 
theoretically feasible, nor underpinned by empirical evidence. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Why profit maximization cannot be a fundamental 
principle in any meaningful ethical theory 
The idea that corporations should pursue the interests of their shareholders, takes its starkest form in 
the sentiment expressed by Milton Friedman, that “the social responsibility of business is to 
increase its profits” (Friedman, 1970). Friedman is very clear in stating that it is illegitimate for a 
corporation to act in a way that is detrimental to shareholder returns.5 Profit maximization is thus a 
moral imperative for corporate executives. The interests of groups other than the shareholders, 
should thus only be given weight to the extent that meeting these interests, also benefits the 
shareholders. The implication is that corporate social responsibility is permissible only if it is 
insincere, i.e. used as an instrument to promote shareholder interests (Bakan, 2004). 
 
To assess whether the Friedmanian position is tenable, we must consider the arguments used to 
support it. There are four basic arguments that underpin this position. Firstly, it is argued that the 
contract between the shareholders and a manager of a firm, binds the manager to pursuing the 
interests of shareholders, and therefore makes it illegitimate to pursue other ends. Secondly, 
pursuing other ends to the detriment of shareholder returns, is equal to taxing the shareholders, and 
taxation is a task for democratically elected governments, which it is illegitimate for managers to 
assume. Thirdly, if businesses focus on too many tasks beyond their core operations, they become 
less efficient. An efficient division of labour between businesses and government, is for businesses 
to create value, and the government to redistribute it. Fourthly, a business that assumes 
responsibilities beyond maximizing profits, will incur added costs, and will therefore be wiped out 
in competition with firms that do not assume such responsibilities. In other words, assuming costly 
responsibilities will be self-defeating, and ultimately futile. Let us review each of these arguments 
in turn. 
 
The first argument, that managers are bound by contract to act only in the interest of shareholders, is 
obviously too simplistic to hold. Two parties that enter into an agreement of any kind, cannot 
reasonably argue that this releases them from responsibility for third parties. For instance, two 
                                                     
5 More precisely, Friedman argues that corporate executives should pursue shareholder interests. In many cases, 
shareholders might be willing to forgo profits for other ends. Even if shareholders do have other interests than maximizing 
profits, this does not reduce the validity of the following arguments, as long as there is some deviation between 
shareholder interests and an ethically motivated social welfare function, which is a reasonable assumption. 
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people that get married, cannot claim that this bond precludes responsibilities for other human 
beings. If this were the case, we would see a proliferation of agreements expressly designed to limit 
the responsibilities of the parties involved. 
 
The second argument, that it is illegitimate for managers to tax owners, treats the question of 
corporate responsibility in an unnecessarily complex manner. The key question here is not whether 
managers should redistribute wealth from the owners to others, but whether shareholders ought to 
give up some of their returns to promote other ends. If one can demand that shareholders sacrifice 
some of their returns for other important ends, the fact that a manager is the one to put this into 
practice, does not nullify the demand on shareholders. 
 
The third argument proceeds from an idea of an ideal division of labour between government and 
business. Both are claimed to be more efficient if they focus on their respective tasks, which works 
to the advantage of society as a whole. The problem with this argument is that the situation is often 
not one which permits the ideal division of labour envisioned. In many countries, especially in the 
third world, governments and public institutions are incapable or unwilling to assume many of the 
duties implied by the ideal division of labour. Given imperfections or restrictions of this kind, it is 
not inconceivable that the most efficient division of labour entails a greater responsibility for 
corporations than focusing on its core business operations. This argument is pursued further in 
Cappelen and Kolstad (2006). 
 
The fourth and final argument in support of the Friedmanian view, states that taking an extra 
responsibility would put a firm out of business. A common way to meet this argument is to say that 
some firms do act responsibly, and are not eliminated by competition. If consumers, workers, or 
shareholders value corporate responsibility, a responsible firm could survive and even thrive. In a 
context of less than perfect competition, corporate responsibility could even confer a strategic 
advantage on a firm. And in fact, empirical studies show that the population of firms in a given 
market is often remarkably heterogeneous.  
 
However, all this counter-argument does is show that the Friedmanian survival argument is 
overstated, it does not fully refute the argument. A more effective counter-argument is to say that if 
acting responsibly puts a firm at a disadvantage in the marketplace, other agents may be responsible 
for lessening the disadvantage. For instance, it may be the responsibility of consumers to pay a 
higher price for goods from responsible firms, or for shareholders to add a responsibility return to 
the standard financial return of firms when allocating investment funds. What the survival argument 
does, is to take too narrow a view of responsibility; when discussing the responsibility of business, 
we need not confine ourselves to just discussing the responsibility of business, we can also take the 
duties of other agents into account. 
 
The arguments put forth to justify a claim that corporations should act in the interest of their 
shareholders, thus do not hold up to closer scrutiny. That these particular arguments fail does not 
immediately imply that an ethical perspective which includes the profit maximization by firms is 
impossible to conceive of. In general terms, there are two ways in which to fit profit maximization 
into an ethical theory. One is to say that profit maximization is a fundamental principle of the 
theory, from which other principles are derived. The other is to argue that profit maximization can 
be derived from some set of fundamental principles which constitute the ethical theory. 
 
To see whether profit maximization makes sense as a fundamental principle of an ethical theory, we 
need to take a closer look at what this would entail. An ethical theory built around (or consistent 
with) the idea that corporations ought only to pursue the interests of their owners, would include a 
strong element of egoism on the part of owners (through the construct of a corporation). This could 
take two forms: i) The ethical theory could argue that owners should maximize their own returns, 
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while other agents (some or all) should not in a similar sense act in their own self-interest, or ii) The 
ethical theory could argue that all agents should act in their own self-interest. 
 
 It is hard to see that the first version does not imply a breach with the principle of impartiality, 
which is a cornerstone of any reasonable ethical theory. It is difficult to argue that there is some 
morally relevant characteristic of owners, something that would set them morally apart from other 
agents, that would make it appropriate for them to pursue their self-interest, while it would be 
improper for others to do the same.  
 
The second version would produce the oxymoron of an ethical theory devoid of ethical 
consideration. As Williams (1993:12) argues, “we have a conception of the ethical that 
understandably relates to us and our actions the demands, needs, claims, desires, and generally, the 
lives of other people, and it is helpful to preserve this conception in what we are prepared to call an 
ethical consideration”. An ethical theory based entirely on self-interest, thus leaves out an essential 
component of any reasonable ethical theory. Moreover, a theory of this kind is likely to be unstable, 
as promoting a state in which everyone pursues their own self-interest, could in some cases require 
non-selfish action. 
 
An ethical theory based on (or including) a fundamental principle of maximization of shareholder 
returns, or profit maximization, is thus a non-starter. If profit maximization is to have a place in an 
ethical perspective, then, it must be as a principle derived from (or permitted by) other fundamental 
principles. Within a basic consequentialist framework, one could for instance argue that it is for the 
best (however that may be defined) that corporations maximize profits. As Williams (1993:13) 
argues, this is a more natural way to support a principle of self-interest. Similarly, within a 
deontological framework, profit maximization could be legitimate to the extent that it is consistent 
with the fundamental normative precepts for action. 
 
If we accept that profit maximization is to be a derivative principle of an ethical theory, however, it 
can by implication no longer be an absolute guide of conduct for corporate executives. Given the 
imperfections of the world, there will be instances where the principle of profit maximization will 
have to be deviated from, in order for corporate action to fulfil the fundamental principles of the 
theory. For instance, within a consequentialist framework, it may be efficient for corporations to 
maximize profits and the government to take care of redistribution. This argument presupposes, 
however, that there exists some sort of government that can redistribute effectively, if there does 
not, the argument breaks down, and the best state of affairs is not necessarily attained by letting 
corporations maximize profits. In an ethical theory where profit maximization is a derivative 
principle for corporate action, it will therefore be subject to exception, it will sometimes have to be 
deviated from to meet more fundamental ends. This line of reasoning and its implications are 
analyzed in more detail in Cappelen and Kolstad (2006). 
 
The implication of the arguments in this section is that the neo-Friedmanian position that CSR 
policies should only be used to further shareholder returns, is ethically indefensible. The standard 
arguments for the Friedmanian position do not hold. No reasonable ethical theory can include a 
fundamental principle of profit maximization. And if profit maximization is to be a derivative 
principle of an ethical theory, it will be subject to exceptions, which implies that CSR policies may 
sometimes have to be used to further other ends than profit maximization. 
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3. CSR and profits do not always go together 
If all good things go together, there is not much point to ethical theory, beyond defining what 
actually counts as good. There would be no need for ethical reasoning in terms of making trade-offs 
and resolving dilemmas, for passing judgment in the hard cases where one set of interests or 
objectives is pitted against another. Much of what has been developed in the field of ethics would 
be beside the point; a utilitarian could simply maximize individual utilities rather than the sum 
across all individuals, which among other things implies that Arrow’s theorem is not of much 
import (Arrow, 1951). 
 
The idea that corporate social responsibility and profits go together is a narrow version of this more 
general notion. The idea does not hold up to closer scrutiny, however, whether from a theoretical or 
empirical perspective. From a theoretical point of view, the position that CSR always increases 
profits, is quite easily refuted. Certainly, a company may get a reputation boost by doing some kind 
of socially beneficial work that goes beyond its normal operations. But after the initial boost, a 
company will not get as much of an effect if it further expands its CSR activities. At some point, the 
costs of expanding CSR activities will outweigh the benefits to the company. Put simply, company 
profits do not increase indefinitely in the number of schools or hospitals it funds. If that were the 
case, we should leave all funding of the social sectors to the private sector, since they can build and 
run hospitals for free. 
 
If we look at empirical studies of how corporate social performance (CSP) affects profitability, we 
cannot conclude from these that the relationship is a generally positive one. In a review conducted 
by Griffin and Mahon (1997), 51 studies were identified which have explored this relationship. 
Though most of these studies found that CSP influences financial performance positively, a 
substantial number of studies found no effect, or even a negative effect. Hillman and Keim (2001) 
also suggest that some types of CSR affect profitability positively, whereas others do not. This 
would suggest that aggregating CSP dimensions into one would give different answers to the 
relationship between CSP and profits, depending on how the CSP dimensions are weighted. 
 
In an attempt to reach a conclusive answer based on past studies, Orlitzky et al (2003) performed a 
meta-analysis which used a particular weighing technique. Their conclusion was that CSP is 
positively correlated with financial performance, or that “social responsibility … is likely to pay 
off”. However, given the methodological shortcomings of past studies, the meta-analysis of Orlitzky 
et al cannot be relied upon for a definite answer. Most past studies are based on limited data, and/or 
omit important control variables, and any attempt to aggregate their findings is therefore 
meaningless. 
 
Addressing the point of omitted variables, McWilliams and Siegel (2000) show that adding R&D 
intensity as a control variable, changes the effect of CSP on profits, from positive to insignificant. 
They take this as evidence for a line of argument that holds that companies expand their CSR 
activities up to the point where the marginal revenues equal the marginal costs, which means that 
there is no profit to be gained from expanding these types of activities at the margin.  
 
Further doubt is cast by the fact that past studies of CSP and profits have relied on cross-section 
techniques, not controlling for firm heterogeneity. In an important contribution, Elsayed and Paton 
(2005) show that while cross-section estimation yields a positive effect of corporate environmental 
performance on profits, panel data estimation reveals no significant effect. More efficient panel data 
estimation can thus substantially change results, and it is important that this be explored for 
dimensions of CSP beyond environmental performance.  
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Finally, a study by Darnall et al (2004) on environmental performance and profitability, suggests 
that “most estimation models used in previous studies did not consider that a firm’s environmental 
performance is endogenous”, i.e. influenced by financial performance. The study therefore 
concludes that “results of prior studies need to be interpreted with care and additional studies are 
needed to evaluate these relationships further”, a point which obviously extends to studies of CSP in 
general and profitability. 
 
The most that can be said from empirical studies, is that the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and profits has not be adequately determined. Based on reasonable theoretical 
arguments, however, there is no reason to expect empirical data to show that the relationship is a 
generally positive one. The dilemma-less view of corporate social responsibility, that CSR increases 
profits, and that the question of which end to pursue is therefore a trivial one, is consequently 
unsupported. 
4. Conclusions 
The comedian and film maker Woody Allen is reported to have said “I’m not afraid of dying, I just 
don’t want to be there when it happens”. Corporate executive today treat dilemmas in a similar 
fashion, they would rather not come face to face with one, and therefore prefer defining them away. 
As the previous analysis shows, however, there are real dilemmas that need to be faced. Corporate 
social responsibility does not generally increase profitability. And when corporate executives only 
implement acts of corporate responsibility that promote profits, and only as much of these activities 
as promotes profits, they are just being profit-minded, not responsible. This is in fact profitability in 
the guise of CSR. The correct way of approaching the issue of corporate social responsibility, is to 
first ask what a company is responsible for, and then implement these responsibilities, whether they 
increase profits or not. And in some cases they will certainly cut into the bottom line. 
 
Here, the reluctant executive might resort to Friedman, and argue that the responsibility of business 
is to increase profits, and only that. However, as this article has argued, this is an untenable position 
from an ethical point of view. There is thus a very real possibility that corporations should in certain 
cases deviate from profit maximization, from maximizing returns to owners, to pursue ends that are 
more important from a social point of view. This does not mean that corporations should abandon 
profit maximization altogether, in certain cases the efficiency enhancing effects of this pursuit will 
make them legitimate, but in other cases other interests will take precedence. 
 
Defining exactly what is the responsibility of corporations, is a question that would benefit from 
further research. One type of approach that can be taken, is that of Cappelen and Kolstad (2006), 
who attempt to derive an optimal division of moral labour between business and other institutions. 
One of the implications of their analysis is that whether corporations should maximize profits or 
not, depends on the ability of other institutions to fulfil other important functions. This entails that 
in countries were public institutions are unable to fulfil functions normally attributed to them, the 
responsibility of corporations increases, and profit maximization should be deviated from. In other 
words, this type of analysis implies that corporations have a greater social responsibility in poor 
countries than in rich countries. 
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SUMMARY
Though corporate social responsibility (CSR) is on the agenda of most major 
corporations, corporate executives still largely support the view that corporations 
should maximize the returns to their owners. There are two lines of defence for 
this position. One is the Friedmanian view that maximizing owner returns is the 
corporate social responsibility of corporations. The other is a position voiced by 
many executives, that CSR and profits go together. This paper argues that the 
first position is ethically untenable, while the latter is not supported by empirical 
evidence. The implication is that there may be good reason for firms to deviate 
from a maxim of profit maximization.
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